Creating a Cost to Spread Misinformation on Social Media

Drew B. Margolin, Yunyun S. Wang

Abstract


This study analyzes systemic incentives that encourage the spread of misinformation on social media. We show how social media’s algorithmic opacity and “open entry” nature incentivize users we call unaccountable spread seekers to overproduce misleading messages. Specifically, these users are encouraged to “propagation hunt,” producing many messages to identify the few that go viral. We propose a remedy to this challenge called the attestation framework, in which users must explicitly declare their intent that a message be eligible to spread. By attesting, users agree to take on some liability for the harm this spread may cause. We show that attestation should substantially curb the activities of unaccountable spread seekers while having minimal impact on other users.


Keywords


misinformation, policy, platforms, incentives, attestation

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