



Theatrical Distribution and P2P Movie Piracy: A Survey of P2P Networks in Hungary Using Transactional Data

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This article examines what appears to be the most important factor shaping file sharing: the failure of traditional cultural markets to efficiently supply the demand in the online environment. Its findings are based on tracking the traffic of movies on three Hungarian P2P networks. This dataset is then matched with cinematic distribution data of the films tracked in P2P transactions. Central to our analysis is the assessment of two piracy paradigms: substitution and shortage, that is, whether pirated content is available through legal or only illegal channels. Shortage-driven downloaders are found to outnumber those downloading only current theater releases. Nonetheless, the supply of films available for downloading is more affected by parameters of cinematic distribution than it is by box office success. Therefore, part of the sales effort directly contributes to propping up piracy.

Introduction

Although the unauthorized reproduction of someone else's creative output for fame or for profit is as old as creativity itself (Alford, 1995; Lendvai, 2008), it was the advent of the technologies of mass reproduction that has made it an everyday, large-scale phenomenon. Even though the reasons that

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brought pre-Internet pirates into existence vary greatly (Bodó, 2011a, 2011b) there is one thing that is common to all of them: their love of, and quest for, profit.

Online, peer-to-peer file swapping is unique in the sense that many of those who participate in it are not driven by the prospect of direct monetary gains. If monetary incentives do not explain P2P file sharing, we have to examine other factors that drive this activity. This article examines what appears to be the most important factor shaping online file sharing: the failure of traditional markets¹. It seeks to determine which factors under the control of well-established institutions engaged in the marketing, distribution, retailing, and lending of cultural goods leave a sizeable demand in the market unserved. We also identify specific points of failure that foster the emergence of do-it-yourself solutions that are, in this case, also piratical.

With the identification of such failures, we hope to serve several aims. First, to explain why P2P file sharing is so popular. Second, to urge the traditional actors to improve the aspects of their businesses that most contribute to these market failures. Third, to help policy makers devise a consumer- and citizen-friendly policy environment in which consumers and citizens in cultural markets are not prosecuted and punished for P2P file sharing if the traditional actors do not, or—perhaps due to structural deficiencies—simply cannot take appropriate action.

The Focus and Scope of the Study

This article presents our findings from measuring the traffic of movies on three Hungarian, BitTorrent²-based, file-sharing networks between May and June 2008. During this observation period, we tracked new titles that appeared on these networks, the location of individual users, and the instances of users downloading, seeding, and uploading these titles. Therefore, we are able to tell who downloaded what from where and for how long. We compare this dataset to another set of databases that tracks the market performance of a traditional movie distribution system—cinemas.³

¹ In economics, market failure is a sign of the inefficient allocation of goods. It can be caused by information asymmetries, non-competitive markets, externalities or public goods, all of which are relevant in the case of cultural markets. In the context of the article we interpret market failure as the demand that could be, but is not legally supplied.

² BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file-sharing technology that makes the distribution of large files among a large number of individuals fast and efficient.

³ The main reasons for focusing on movies rather than on music are: the lack of data on the legal markets of other cultural goods; the size of the repertoire to track and identify (80 million music tracks versus a few thousand film titles); and the BitTorrent technology being the most popular P2P protocol in Hungary, as well as the best suited to circulate large files, such as audiovisual works.

The Transformation of Film Markets

New Logics of Distribution

New gadgets, new middlemen, and new business models transform the way cultural works are distributed and exhibited in the digital world. The most radical transformation of the distribution of audiovisual content has occurred in television and in video rental markets. In the model of what Csigó (2009) calls “convergent television,” the producers of audiovisual content attempt to surpass the closed garden approach of content distribution by making their content available on many different online channels—from the pay-per-download iTunes store to the ad-supported website hulu.com. This enables content to resurface and circulate in contexts defined by viewers and not by the producers or professional middlemen responsible for contextualizing and programming traditional content flows. The logic of convergent television relies on the activity and loyalty of fans in the distribution process, meaning that users can create program flows and repackage programs to meet their own tastes and preferences.

Such a transformation of the legal distribution logic is hardly noticeable in the movie industry. The online multichannel availability of cinematic works is still characterized—at least in Hungary and other less developed and less important markets—by many limitations:

- *Format scarcity.* Offline distribution channels offer titles in a wide variety of formats from the IMAX format to DVD rental. Such a variety is missing from online distribution.
- *Pricing problems.* Rightsholders’ revenue expectations limit online pricing options, with the choice often being between a single pay-per-view price and the free black market.
- *The size of the legal catalog is limited.* A significant chunk of the back catalog, as well as local titles, niche works, older titles, and midlist titles (to borrow a term from the publishing industry), are not yet available via online channels. In Hungary, online video rental services typically offer films within the small window of the three to four months that follows the three- to six-month period after the DVD release. This results in a limited, constantly changing—and therefore unpredictable and unreliable—online supply.
- *Timing problems.* In the case of new releases, consumers from around the globe are exposed to the marketing aimed at the most important Western markets. This exposure inevitably generates demand on local, non-Western markets that in most cases need to wait a considerable amount of time before the producers are willing to sell their wares there.
- *While cultural consumption is a socially embedded practice, traditional market outlets, unlike file-sharing sites, hardly offer social services.* File sharing—or rather the informal media sphere—is inherently social (Becker & Clement, 2003; Condry, 2004; J. Cooper & Harrison, 2001; M. N. Cooper, 2005; Giesler & Pohlmann, 2003; Huang, 2005; Hunter & Spitz, 2003; Keenan, 2008; Manuel, 1993; Marshall, 2004; Rojek, 2005; Strahilevitz, 2003). File-sharing networks are online communities organized around special interest P2P hubs. Legitimate online services that offer audiovisual content have yet to socially cater to their corresponding communities.

In each of these dimensions, P2P networks have the competitive edge over legitimate online services, meaning that it is not only access options that compete (free vs. non-free, legal vs. illegal, with or without digital rights management, etc.), but distribution logics as well. This latter dimension is usually missing from the analysis of P2P networks.

Changes in the Hungarian Movie Distribution Infrastructure

To put the current state of the movie distribution infrastructure in Hungary into perspective, one needs to return to the decade before 1989. Due to seemingly limitless state sponsorship and to the ruling party elite's strong cultural drive (György, 2005), Hungary enjoyed a dense network of libraries, cinemas, and other cultural institutions. Most villages had some kind of a multifunctional institution, a small cultural center that served as a concert or meeting hall, but that also could be converted into a screening hall. The high number of cinema screens (and libraries) during the 1980s reflects this situation.




Figure 1. The decline of the number of libraries and cinema screens after the post-communist transition.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.

As it is shown in Figure 1, with the collapse of the planned economy in 1989, the financing of this network came to a close with dramatic consequences:

- The number of screens shrank by 90% during the 1990s.
- The remaining screens relocated to bigger urban centers leaving (in 2006) as much as 99% of villages and 70% of (small) towns without a cinema screen. On another level, 57% of settlements within Hungarian statistical regions do not have a cinema (Borsos, 2007).
- The screens in urban centers are increasingly located in shopping malls and operated by a handful of U.S.-based companies. In the year of our study, such multiplexes controlled 49% of all screens and 50% of all seats, they sold 76% of all tickets, and they claimed 84% of all revenues. It goes without saying that multiplexes have a fundamental effect on what is being shown in cinemas, skewing movie supply toward popular U.S. titles.
- Public subsidies aimed at reconstructing smaller art house cinemas (that show movies outside of the mainstream culture) did nothing to change the uneven distribution of cinemas; rather, it resulted in upgrading already established cinema institutions without developing new ones. (Borsos, 2007)

In the last two decades, movie theaters, along with other cultural retailers, have receded into urban centers where effective, solvent demand was to be found.

The quick change in the economic and legal environment eroded the basic cultural supply. This is true in qualitative, content-wise terms, in terms of the physical state of infrastructure, in the costs of operation, and in human resources, which is an especially serious problem because due to their cheap accessibility these institutions were mostly used by lower income social groups in need for access to cultural goods. (Bárdosi, Lakatos, & Varga, 2004, p. 10)

This process of regression proved to be a fatal one: The lack of solvent demand and adequate funding ruined the distribution infrastructure, and its collapse left that market demographic unserved, one that could have paid for these services, though it was not large enough to constitute an economically viable market.

The shift from independent cinemas to multiplexes also transformed the content projected on screens. Multiplexes focus on the few most profitable titles, while those institutions that could serve midlist titles have all but vanished. The lack of cinemas is a problem in itself, but it also generates another one: the lack of diversity in titles.

The decline of cinema in Hungary is further reinforced by several factors common in other markets: the introduction of commercial broadcast television stations and cable networks, the rapid diffusion of home entertainment systems, and the rise in the number of households that are online.

Hungarian film piracy must be understood in this context.

Data Sources

We have decided to track three of the most popular Hungarian BitTorrent trackers: BitHUMen,⁴ nCore,⁵ and Independence.⁶ We made these choices based on reputation, stability, number of users/peers, number and type of titles, and access. Information on these dimensions was based on interviews with and recommendations by file sharers.

We tracked them by crawling⁷ their Web interfaces, saving every bit of information that the server makes public to individual users. As a result, we had access to user and torrent profiles. Through the lists of seeders, leechers, and downloaders, we were also able to reconstruct every torrent's traffic history. According to our estimates, using this method we were able to reconstruct torrent traffic with 99% precision.

⁴ BitHUMen service is the oldest Hungarian tracker with a solid reputation and a committed community. It is also the world's 26th most-sought-after tracker in terms of the number of invitation requests found on the Internet (Sharky, 2008). It is relatively free of ads, suggesting a nonprofit operation.

⁵ NCore ranks 40th in the same list by Sharky (2008) and is an ad-based service. Its specialty is that it accepts releases from outside "the scene,"—the unofficial circle of trusted release groups. Anyone can release on nCore, giving users access to a wider variety of titles, but that degree of access sometimes also translates to lower quality and lower download speeds.

⁶ Independence is a relative newcomer compared with the other two BitTorrent services. Any user can register on the site; however, registration is not free. Independence reaches out to users who cannot get access to the other more reclusive trackers, offering them a chance to buy themselves into an exclusive world. This, and the site's strong emphasis on monetizing its user base, appeared to create a bad reputation for the site and for its owner among Hungarian file sharers, who seem to deem such an unabashedly commercial approach objectionable. Nevertheless, due to its relative openness, it was included in our study.

⁷ To achieve a nonintrusive, difficult-to-detect monitoring of closed hubs, we developed the appropriate monitoring technology. Open-access hubs are easy to monitor as they do not attempt to hide their activities. Closed hubs require more precautions to ensure that monitoring activity does not get detected by site administrators. Such a clandestine monitoring effort raises several ethical issues that were addressed on several levels. First, we gathered data that was available for each and every ordinary member of the torrent tracker. We did not collect any information that could be used either by us or by other parties to connect the online user profiles with personal data. On the other hand, we did engage in a monitoring effort without the consent of either the site administrators or the users. This was necessary, as acquiring the same amount and depth of information from the site administrators would have been impossible because they either don't archive such information, or they do everything possible to protect their communities. Before, during, and after the data collection period, we clearly communicated to the Hungarian file-sharing scene that we are doing research on the effect of file sharing on traditional markets. We were also present on online discussion boards to personally answer any questions about our research.

We have matched this dataset with three other data sources: (a) a program guide, including the time and place of every movie screening in Hungary since 2000; (b) the Hungarian box office statistics for new releases; and (c) ratings and genre classification information from the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). (See Table 1 for a detailed set of variables used in the analysis.)

Table 1. Data Used in the Analysis.

Data from the P2P Networks	Box Office Statistics
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Title • Upload and download date • Downloader ID and location • Duration of the upload/download activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Title • Date of release • No. of tickets sold in the year of release • Box office revenue (in HUF) in the year of release • No. of copies (reels) of the film at the time of its release
Cinema Program Guide	IMDb (where available)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Title • No. and dates of screenings • Cinema location 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Title • User rating • No. of ratings • Genre categories

Descriptive Statistics of P2P Movie Black Markets

We identified 4,838 films, which we then sorted into five categories according to their P2P and cinematic availability. The first category includes films that were screened parallel to the tracking of downloading activity (n=152). The second category comprises films that were screened in cinemas during the tracking period, but of which no signs were found on the P2P markets (n=592). The third category contains films that were recently screened in cinemas—after 2000, but not in the time frame of tracking—and were available for download (n=776). The fourth category is films that were screened recently (as in the previous category), but were not available for download (n=627). In the fifth category, we placed films that were available through the black market, but could not be found anywhere in the movie program guide; that is, those that were screened either prior to 2000 or were not screened at all in Hungary (n=2691). Finally, in the sixth category, there are films that were not available on either the P2P

market or in cinemas. As we do not know anything about these films, we did not analyze this category. The distribution of films among the categories is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Content Categories According to P2P and Cinematic Availability.

(The numbers in each cell: top left, bold: the number of films in the category; top right: row %; bottom left: column %; bottom right: total %.)

	In the tracking period May 1 – June 30, 2008, the film ...				Sum	
	was available of P2P		was not available on P2P			
Films screened in the tracking period	152	20%	592	80%	744	100
	4%	3%	49%	12%	15%	
Films screened recently (before the tracking period but after 2000)	776	55%	627	45%	1,403	100
	21%	16%	51%	13%	29%	
Films screened before 2000 or not screened at all	2,691	100%	no data		2,691	100
	74%	56%			56%	
Sum	3,619	75%	1,219	25%	4,838	100
	100%		100%		100%	100

We found that nearly 75% of all the P2P available films are in the *not screened* category. Such a high proportion could be an indicator of the importance of peer-to-peer networks in the diffusion of cinematic content, as it suggests that one of the main motivations for downloading is scarcity of titles in the legitimate market. Before accepting this conclusion, though, we should note that we lack conclusive data on DVD (sales and rental), television (broadcast, cable, satellite, and IPTV) and legitimate online distribution channels. Therefore, we cannot readily accept or reject the scarcity model on the content side.

Nevertheless, it is clear that release windows strictly define when, and in what format the content is available on the market, as well as for how long. The traditional system of audiovisual content distribution therefore places strict rules on the accessibility of content. Accessibility can be limited temporally: DVD distribution rights expire, broadcast dates pass. It can be limited geographically: The closest retail outlet might be inconveniently far away. P2P downloading can bridge not only these types of limitations but also cinematic distribution's inefficiency to keep available back catalog and midlist titles. The demand is there as the data clearly demonstrate.

One might be surprised to see that only 20% of the screened films since 2000 were available through P2P networks during the time frame of our study. On one hand, the explanation for this phenomenon is that the studios successfully curb piracy. On the other hand, we see a trend that brings the release dates in different countries closer together (as a response to piracy), with the data suggesting that—at least in the case of American films—the P2P market needs to wait longer and longer for the first high quality pirate copy.⁸

The descriptive statistics of films in our study (Table 3) explain some of the dynamics of the P2P black market. The life span of the films in category 1 (*in cinemas + on P2P*) is twice as long as that of those in category 3 (*not in cinemas + on P2P*): The difference is nearly 40 days, indicating that the new releases are more interesting for downloaders than are older releases. This conclusion is further supported by the number of downloads in these categories where the ratio is more than 5 to 1: While a new release gets 1,042 downloads on average, an older, *not in cinema* title receives only 190. While *new releases* get disproportionately more downloads, the overall download volume is more balanced due to the high number of films in the *not screened* categories. Category 5 (*not screened at all + on P2P*) has the highest download volume (347.000, see Table 3) indicating a strong demand for back catalog titles.

For those who stress the destructiveness of P2P film sharing, the data on the overall downloads versus the number of total tickets sold might point to smoking gun evidence. The table, however, contains the audience size for the entirety of the films' life span. If we want to compare legal and illegal audiences, we need to narrow the number of sold tickets to the time frame of downloading activity. In that case, we find that for 1,650,000 tickets sold, there are 157,000 downloads, making the impact of the black market equivalent to slightly less than 10% of tickets sold. While the usual caveats apply here—we underestimate the number of P2P users, as well as the number of downloads—this 1:10 ratio is far from the apocalypse that content owners like to suggest in their rhetoric.

It seems that films with more screenings have a higher chance to be downloaded. There is a category of films (with around 400 screenings) that do not even make it to the black market. The same applies to the number of cinemas where a film is available: Wider distribution goes hand in hand with a higher probability of black market availability. Films available on the black market have higher audiences and higher box office revenues as well.

⁸ According to Baio (2009), in the case of Oscar-nominated films, the time between the theatrical release and the first illegally distributed (usually low quality) version rose from 5 to 32 days between 2003 and 2009, while the first DVD quality copy does not hit the black markets for 58 days, up from 45 days in 2003).

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Films in our Study.

(Data for the cinematic distribution are for the entire life span of the films and thus not limited to the tracking time frame.)

		Films screened in the tracking timeframe		Films screened before tracking time frame, but after 2000		Films not screened (or only before 2000)	Sum
		Available on P2P	Not available on P2P	Available on P2P	Not available on P2P	Available on P2P	
Torrent life span (days)	Mean	79	0	40	0	24	22
	Maximum	617	0	439	0	440	617
	Σ	11,970	0	30,998	0	65,771	108,739
	Std Dev.	99	0	41	0	33	39
No. of downloads	Mean	1,042	0	190	0	129	135
	Maximum	9,108	0	2,579	0	6,736	9,108
	Σ	158,358	0	147,357	0	346,844	652,559
	Std Dev.	1,874	0	247	0	335	461
Theatrical life span (days)	Mean	110	126	103	102	.	110
	Maximum	418	417	409	410	.	418
	Σ	16,757	74,525	79,959	63,955	.	235,196
	Std Dev.	137	136	108	107	.	118
No. of screenings	Mean	2,636	434	1,785	1,487	0	615
	Maximum	12,588	11,789	14,008	11,284	0	14,008
	Σ	400,623	256,689	1,384,916	932,073	0	2,974,301
	Std Dev.	2,735	1,161	2,356	2,196	0	1,604
No. of cinemas screening	Mean	63	19	69	60	0	23
	Maximum	249	286	301	301	0	301
	Σ	9,635	11,087	53,533	37,326	0	111,581
	Std Dev.	49	35	72	69	0	50
Box office revenue (million HUF)	Mean	93	20	68	58	0	10
	Maximum	676	405	686	556	0	686
	Σ	8,270	2,340	14,613	8,367	0	33,590
	Std Dev.	126	47	96	91	0	46
No. of tickets sold (pcs)	Mean	99,064	27,107	78,673	68,703	0	11,928
	Maximum	853,926	501,098	826,129	610,135	0	853,926
	Σ	8,816,665	3,144,467	16,914,660	9,961,981	0	38,837,773
	Std Dev.	149,989	58,240	116,819	106,648	0	53,849
Tickets per screenings (pcs)	Mean	24	17	23	21	.	21
	Maximum	121	55	101	70	.	121
	Σ	2,136	1,921	4,895	3,095	.	12,046
	Std Dev.	17	8	13	11	.	13
No. of copies	Mean	18	7	17	16	0	2
	Maximum	41	41	43	43	0	43
	Σ	1,690	828	2,917	1,773	0	7,208
	Std Dev.	11	8	9	10	0	7
Time between the theatrical release & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Mean	104	122	239	244	.	199
	Maximum	410	410	410	410	.	410
	Σ	15,882	72,239	185,246	153,205	.	426,572
	Std Dev.	138	135	129	124	.	142
Time between the last theatrical screening & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Mean	0	0	136	143	.	91
	Maximum	0	0	408	409	.	409
	Σ	0	0	105,420	89,353	.	194,773
	Std Dev.	0	0	120	117	.	116

These descriptive statistics support our preliminary hypothesis that file sharing has both a substitution and a shortage aspect, both of them significant. On one hand, the sheer number of films not available in cinemas, and the volume of downloads they generate suggest a huge, unmet demand that is being supplied by film sharers themselves.

On the other hand, it is clear that new releases have the highest number of downloads per film. Knowing the process of black market releases—where high quality P2P copies usually appear after the cinematic release—we can exclude that option from the hypotheses that P2P popularity would cause high cinema attendance. Instead, the logic works the other way: The marketing of new releases also generates demand on the black markets while older titles are not marketed, thus lowering their online popularity.

These findings are further detailed by the correlations between the different variables. (Table 4. Correlation of Variables for all Films in the Analysis.) There is a statistically significant correlation between the *number of downloads* and certain variables of the cinematic distribution for all films in the analysis. Nevertheless, these correlations are weak: Even the strongest connection between *downloads* and the *number of copies* is only 0,116. The *number of downloads* does show a slightly positive correlation to *cinema attendance* and a slightly negative correlation to *time since the cinematic release*. This suggests that recent, mass appeal films have higher downloads. In this same selection, the strongest connection (0,6) is between *cinematic life span* and *time between the cinematic and P2P release*. Films that are screened for a longer period enter the black markets later than do those titles that quickly disappear from the cinemas. However, longer *cinematic life span* does not necessarily translate to larger audiences, as the weak correlation (0,174) between *life span* and *ticket sales* shows.

If we narrow our scope to those films that were available on both platforms (Table 5.: Correlation of Variables for the Films Simultaneously in Cinemas and on P2P Net), we find no change in the main tendencies; only the weights differ slightly. The negative correlation between film *life span* and *number of downloads* is stronger: Movies quickly pulled from theaters are downloaded more. The most notable difference is the stronger correlation between *downloads* and *number of copies* and *screenings*—while there is no significant connection with *number of tickets sold*. This means that a film's popularity on the black market is more closely related to marketing efforts than it is to its actual popularity or appeal. Films with a high number of copies in theaters are (by inference) popular movies whose wide release is supposedly supported with appropriate marketing in various media by the distributor. Therefore, we treat this variable as an appropriate proxy for the distributors' revenue expectations. Such expectations hardly come true in every case—there are many well- advertised flops in the market—but for the attention of downloaders, this factor is more important than is actual attendance. Marketing by distributors is more important than is word of mouth about the actual quality of the movie. It is also ironic that marketing cannot guarantee high box office revenues, but it does ensure that films will be popular on black markets.

Table 4. Correlation of Variables for all Films in the Analysis.

		Torrent life span (days)	Number of downloads	Theatrical life span (days)	No. of screenings	No. of cinemas screening	Box office revenue (million HUF)	No. of tickets sold (pcs)	Tickets per screenings (pcs)	No. of copies	Time bet. the theatrical release & 1 st day of tracking period	theatrical screening & the 1 st day of tracking period
Torrent life span (days)	Pearson.Corr.	1										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000										
	N	4838										
No. of downloads	Pearson.Corr.	0.654	1									
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000									
	N	4838	4838									
Theatrical life span (days)	Pearson.Corr.	-0.073	-0.093	1								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,000	0,000								
	N	2147	2147	2147								
No. of screenings	Pearson.Corr.	0.126	0.116	-0.043	1							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,046	0,000							
	N	4838	4838	2147	4838							
No. of cinemas screening	Pearson.Corr.	0.073	0.054	0,000	0.883	1						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,994	0,000	0,000						
	N	4838	4838	2147	4838	4838						
Box office revenue (million HUF)	Pearson.Corr.	0.097	0.075	0.104	0.880	0.736	1					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,014	0,000	0,000	0,000					
	N	3256	3256	565	3256	3256	3256					
No. of tickets sold (pcs)	Pearson.Corr.	0.083	0.056	0.147	0.867	0.733	0.991	1				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,002	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000				
	N	3256	3256	565	3256	3256	3256	3256				
Tickets per screenings (pcs)	Pearson.Corr.	0.068	0,002	0.206	0.599	0.562	0.804	0.828	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,108	0,967	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000			
	N	565	565	565	565	565	565	565	565			
No. of copies	Pearson.Corr.	0.131	0.156	-0.123	0.931	0.942	0.757	0.737	0.512	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,007	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000		
	N	3178	3178	487	3178	3178	3144	3144	453	3178		
Time between theatrical release & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Pearson.Corr.	-0.044	-0.131	0.606	-0.008	0.171	0.086	0.122	0.174	0,040	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,040	0,000	0,000	0,697	0,000	0,041	0,004	0,000	0,375	0,000	
	N	2147	2147	2147	2147	2147	565	565	565	487	2147	
Time between the last theatrical screening & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Pearson.Corr.	0,022	-0.063	-0.273	0,034	0.207	0,003	0,004	0,007	0.198	0.599	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,319	0,004	0,000	0,118	0,000	0,949	0,923	0,873	0,000	0,000	0,000
	N	2147	2147	2147	2147	2147	565	565	565	487	2147	2147

Table 5. Correlation of Variables for the Films Simultaneously in Cinemas and on P2P Networks.

		Torrent life-span (days)	No. of downloads	Theatrical life span (days)	No. of screenings	No. of cinemas screening	Box office revenue (million HUF)	No. of tickets sold (pcs)	Tickets per screenings (pcs)	No. of copies	Time between theatrical release & the 1st day of tracking	Time bet. last theatrical screening & 1st
Torrent life span (days)	Pearson Corr.	1										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000										
	N	744										
No. of downloads	Pearson Corr.	0,792	1									
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000									
	N	744	744									
Theatrical life span (days)	Pearson Corr.	-0,120	-0,144	1								
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,000	0,000								
	N	744	744	744								
No. of screenings	Pearson Corr.	0,388	0,285	-0,099	1							
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,007	0,000							
	N	744	744	744	744							
No. of cinemas screening	Pearson Corr.	0,281	0,189	-0,002	0,876	1						
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,000	0,959	0,000	0,000						
	N	744	744	744	744	744						
Box office revenue (million HUF)	Pearson Corr.	0,198	0,064	0,029	0,864	0,682	1					
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,004	0,363	0,681	0,000	0,000	0,000					
	N	205	205	205	205	205	205					
No. of tickets sold (pcs)	Pearson Corr.	0,156	0,023	0,070	0,839	0,686	0,978	1				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,025	0,741	0,317	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000				
	N	205	205	205	205	205	205	205				
Tickets per screenings (pcs)	Pearson Corr.	0,101	0,022	0,169	0,598	0,584	0,792	0,836	1			
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,148	0,757	0,015	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000			
	N	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205			
No. of copies	Pearson Corr.	0,305	0,212	-0,116	0,880	0,812	0,732	0,697	0,567	1		
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000	0,002	0,094	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000		
	N	210	210	210	210	210	186	186	186	210		
Time between theatrical release & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Pearson Corr.	-0,125	-0,147	1,000	-0,107	-0,010	0,024	0,066	0,169	-0,120	1	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,001	0,000	0,000	0,004	0,775	0,729	0,350	0,016	0,082	0,000	
	N	744	744	744	744	744	205	205	205	210	744	
Time between the last theatrical screening & the first day of the tracking period (wks)	Pearson Corr.											
	Sig. (2-tailed)											
	N	744	744	744	744	744	205	205	205	210	744	744

P2P Sharing in the Substitution versus Shortage Dichotomy

So far, films are our units of analysis. Now, we turn to users to further understand substitution and shortage dimensions. More than half of all film downloads were of releases absent from Hungarian cinemas after 2000. We interpret this as a sign of the shortage paradigm, but how does this picture look from the perspective of the users?

We found little surprise here. As the data in Table 7 suggests, nearly two-thirds of users download both new and older titles. Only 10% of our users downloaded only new releases, that is, films also available in cinemas at time of download. On the other hand, nearly 30% of users ignored such films and downloaded only older titles. This could support the shortage paradigm, but if we turn to Table 6, it becomes obvious that the reality is a bit more complex. While only a small minority of users downloads only new releases, nearly 3 of every 4 users download such films occasionally. While the bulk of piracy is of older titles—92% download such titles—new releases also fall prey to illegal downloading.

We found further evidence to support the shortage paradigm when we examined how many titles users downloaded in each category during the tracking period. While those who downloaded only new releases downloaded 1.3 films on average, those who exclusively downloaded older titles downloaded 2.6 films. These are not the typical users though. Those who download old and new films alike download a whopping 16 films on average (2 films per week).

In all, we can say that for the majority of users, downloading fills shortages and substitutes legal options. However, more people use P2P networks as a result of shortages (28%) than they do to substitute (8%). This former group generates a higher overall download volume than does the latter.

Table 6. Number and Share of Downloaders and Downloads According to Theater Availability of Films. (One user can belong to multiple categories.)

Cat.		No. of down-loaders	As of all down-loaders ($\Sigma > 100\%$)	No. of downloads	As of all downloads ($\Sigma = 100\%$)	No. of downloads per downloader
1	In theatres during the tracking period	42,982	72%	158,359	24%	3.7
2	In theatres before the tracking period and after 2000	37,162	62%	147.357	23%	4.0
3	Not screened or in theatres only before 2000	50,477	84%	346,944	53%	6.9
	All users	59,793	100%	652,559	100%	10.9
2+3	Films not available in theatres during the tracking period	55,264	92%	494,201	76%	8.9

Table 7. Number and Share of Downloaders and Downloads According to Theater Availability of Films. (One user belongs to one category only.)

Cat.		No. of downloaders	As of all downloaders ($\Sigma=100\%$)	No. of downloads	As of all downloads ($\Sigma=100\%$)	No. of downloads per downloader
1	In theatres during the tracking period	4,529	8%	6,028	1%	1.3
2	In theatres during and before the tracking period	38,455	64%	603,659	93%	15.7
3	In theatres before the tracking period and after 2000	8,015	13%	28,500	4%	3.6
4	Not screened or in theatres only before 2000	8,794	15%	14,372	2%	1.6
All users		59,793	100%	652,559	100%	19
3+4	Films not available in theatres during the tracking period	16,809	28%	42,873	7%	2.6

Film Supply and Demand on the P2P Marketplace

Studies on the interconnections between legal sales and piracy typically focus on the impact of downloading on sales, especially in the case of the music industry (e.g., see Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf, 2007). This is a logical approach in the study of markets where the years since 2000 have seen legal sales plummet and P2P piracy rise. Understandably, researchers are formulating their questions partly by addressing the claims of industry representatives on the alleged negative impact on sales because of piracy, most significantly file sharing.

Our analysis reverses this framework for three reasons. First, rather than isolating piracy's impact among the many factors driving supply and demand in the case of legal content, our main objective is to explain how supply and demand arise on P2P networks. Throughout this article we have argued in favor of studying these networks as a marketplace with its own intrinsic mechanisms of production and consumption. Our emphasis on the two complementary functions of piracy—providing

alternatives to legal purchases (substitution) and compensating for market failures (shortage reduction)—calls for an investigation of the factors that drive these very mechanisms. Second, that our data on the legal marketplace come exclusively from cinematic distribution implies a stock of available legal products (i.e., theater-viewing opportunities) that is considerably narrower than for recorded content. Consumption of theater-screened content is delimited in space and time: People will see only those films that are playing in theaters. At the same time, the spectrum of films available via file sharing is considerably larger—59% vs. 41% for the films analyzed in this section (see Table 8)—partly due to the short two-month observation period. If we concentrate only on how sales of movie theater tickets are affected by piracy, we will dismiss valuable information regarding the bigger picture. Our perspective would, of course, be different if more data on the legal marketplace—particularly, DVD sales figures by titles—were available. In that case, the question of how piracy impacts sales of recorded content would be prominent. Finally, and perhaps most important, even for those films that played in theaters during the observation period, this availability is merely theoretical. While every film in that segment had at least one movie theater screening in Hungary, it is not known which of those films played in theaters where the users effectively had access to view—that is, the theater was located within a reasonable distance from where they live or go about their daily activities. Only a fraction of users divulged their place of residence (doing so was optional) in the personal data on the user interface of the P2P services whose transactions were tracked in our data collection, so we could not use this information for the overwhelming majority of the films observed. Therefore, information relating to how any film “received theater play in Hungary during the tracking period” is hardly sufficient to be considered as an actual option.

Table 8. Films Included in the Analysis of Demand and Supply.

		Available for downloading?		Total	
		Yes	No		
In theaters during observation period?	Yes	n	85	97	182
		row%	47%	53%	100%
		col%	35%	48%	41%
	No	n	160	107	267
		row%	60%	40%	100%
		col%	65%	52%	59%
	Total	n	245	204	449
		row%	55%	45%	100%
		col%	100%	100%	100%

The discussion of what factors shape P2P supply and demand is organized into three subsections according to the theater life span of the films analyzed: (a) the entire pool for which parameters of cinematic distribution were available; followed by (b) those films that played in theaters (at least once) during the two-month tracking period; and (c) films that played in theaters prior to the tracking period. The analysis relates to content substitution in the second scenario and content shortage in the third.

The explanatory models of supply and demand use different sets of observations and different methods. In the case of supply, the question is: What factors explain that a film is shared on P2P networks? Accordingly, the analysis is performed on films both available and unavailable for downloading. Pertaining to the specificity of P2P piracy—content can be supplied with relative ease and then multiplied ad infinitum, even if only one original copy is shared—the suitable dependent variable of P2P supply is dichotomous: shared versus not shared. In the case of demand, the question is: What factors explain the number of completed downloads a film generates on P2P networks? Here, the analysis is restricted to the pool of films that were shared for downloading; the dependent variable is the quantity of downloads per film during the tracking period.

These distinctions regarding the universe of reference for the two separate analyses are crucial. Taking the example of book publishing, the question of what gets published and what factors affect book sales requires not only different statistical models but also different sets of observations. Just as one can only buy a book that has been published, one can only download a film that has been transformed into a digital copy and made available to the P2P community. Emphasizing this issue in the case of P2P content piracy is less trivial than it might seem at first glance and further underscores the significance of research conducted on real-time transaction data. Had we relied on data from indirect observations (e.g., questionnaire surveys), we would not have been able to make such distinctions. We would know only what films the individuals in our sample have downloaded during this or that period, but we wouldn't have any information on P2P supply, that is, which titles were actually available for them to download. Lack of knowledge about these references would also complicate the definition of demand. Having already pointed out the importance of the role played by releasers and site administrators in determining what content is shared on P2P networks, we can also say that copy releasing and uploading perform the same function in P2P piracy as publishing does in the book industry. As direct observation of transactions is the only method to differentiate between supply and demand in P2P piracy, the models presented subsequently in this article provide insight into hitherto unexplored mechanisms.

All Observed Films

This section discusses supply and demand in the case of all films whose distribution parameters were collected, regardless of whether they did or did not receive theater play during the observation period. The dependent variable for the supply model is the availability for downloading: A film may be either available (coded 1) or missing from the network (coded 0). To explain the availability of films on P2P networks, we use the parameters of their cinematic distribution. As noted earlier, this is possible because few films get released onto P2P networks before their theater premiere, and high (near DVD) quality copies usually take some time to appear. The other argument in favor of their inclusion in explanatory models is that these variables are key indicators of the sales effort and hence indispensable for an analysis of the interconnections between legal and illicit markets.

The first supply model is the regression of the P2P availability of all films observed during the tracking period and for which the parameters of their cinematic distribution (date of premiere, copies distributed for theater screening, audience size measured by tickets sold, and life span in theaters) are

available.⁹ The set also includes the IMDb rating, which is an average of ratings given by users of the IMDb website on a 10-point scale¹⁰ and genre categories (based on IMDb).¹¹ As with all subsequent models, each regression is presented in two versions: one without (Version A) and one with genre categories (Version B).

In Supply Model 1A (Table 9), the combined effects of the five parameters of cinematic distribution, plus the IMDb score, explain 9% of the P2P supply. Although this might not seem very high, it is instructive to examine the two variables having a significant impact on which films appear on P2P networks.¹² The effect of the number of copies distributed to theaters is 3 times more than that of theatergoers. It is legitimate to presume that the number of copies in theaters is also a proxy for the sales effort by the distributor, as films showing in multiple theaters are obviously accompanied by more intense campaigns than are those with fewer copies. Therefore, the higher impact of copies suggests that the publicity generated by theater distribution is itself more important in influencing which content will be subject to piracy than is the number of actual theatergoers—a finding also found in other subsequent models.¹³ This is most likely because, as intense sales efforts generate attention among targets, this attention will in turn also materialize in the form of a higher likelihood of P2P availability of content. What is crucial in this perspective is less the attention of ordinary downloaders than it is the judgment of P2P releasers and site administrators who act as filters in determining which content will be offered for users.

⁹ Because not all of these variables are available for the totality of titles, the number of titles included in the regressions (N=449) is lower than the total of titles whose P2P circulation was observed.

¹⁰ These rankings come from mostly non-Hungarian audiences, except for Hungarian-produced films with no international distribution. We chose to include this variable as a proxy for audience appeal or popularity that may or may not be reflected in box office revenues.

¹¹ As the number of original genre categories would be difficult to handle for regression models, genres were categorized. Any film can—and most of the films analyzed here do—belong in several genres. Using principal-components analysis, we isolated five *metagenres*, which together explain 57% of the variance of 14 genres included in the analysis: *family* (family, animation, adventure, fantasy), *escapism* (action, sci-fi), *violence* (horror, thriller, mystery), *high culture* (war, history, drama), and *light entertainment* (romance, comedy). Variables corresponding to these categories were entered in the form of principal-component scores, which in practical terms means that a film belonging in several subgenres of any category enters the equation with a higher score than those films belonging in only one such genre.

¹² With the exception of principal-component scores for genre categories, all continuous variables (including the dependent variable in linear models) enter the regressions in their logarithmic form. To facilitate the comparison of effects in logistic regressions, we have also calculated the standardized regression coefficient (β) on the basis of the original *B* coefficients. These should be interpreted in the same way as are the β coefficients of linear regression.

¹³ To avoid multicollinearity, independent variables are entered in their residual forms resulting from successive regressions, based on an assumption about their causal interconnections. This sequence begins with genres and time since a film's premiere, goes through number of copies made, number of tickets sold, and theater life span, and then ends with IMDb rating.

The addition of genre information in Supply Model 1B results in a spectacular increase of explained variance (16%). Moreover, three genres have a bigger impact on P2P availability than does audience size. The fact that *violent* and *escapist* content is attracting more attention is hardly surprising. More counterintuitive is the positive impact of *family-oriented* films, which suggests a hitherto less discussed aspect of P2P piracy worth exploring in future research. It may be that P2P gatekeepers are especially responsive to the demands of parents with small children—and perhaps also children above a certain age—looking for this type of content (many releasers may also themselves fall into these categories). Finally, *light entertainment* content is less likely to be offered for downloading.

In comparison with the determinants of supply, the regressions of demand (Table 10) reveal a more complex set of effects. Indeed, 4 of the 5 factors of cinematic distribution are significant predictors of downloaded quantity. The impact of each variable is also informative. In broad terms, there is an indication that audience appeal (or reaction) plays a more important role in shaping P2P demand than does supply. This is demonstrated by the reduced impact of distributed copies matching that of audience size, but most important, by the more significant and bigger impact of viewer rating—a measure of popularity. The implication is that the sales effort has a bigger relative influence on what is shared by P2P gatekeepers than on what ordinary network users are actually looking for. The latter rely less on marketing impulses than they do on peer evaluation, though it is obviously impossible to ascribe each of our independent variables entirely to either the sales effort or audience appeal.¹⁴ Given the proliferation of online media discussing a variety of cinema topics, the major channels of audience reaction are most likely to be review articles and even user-generated content (forums, blogs, etc.) rather than word of mouth.

Demand for a film among P2P pirates is also heavily influenced by novelty: time since the premiere has the biggest impact on how often a film is downloaded, even when controlling for genre (Demand Model 1B). The genre effect is less pronounced than it is in the case of supply: *Escapism* is more sought after among downloaders while *light entertainment* is less so.

¹⁴ The *number of tickets sold* variable enters the model as a residual, that is, the part of the original variable that is not explained by genre, copies, and time since premiere.

Table 9. Explanation of P2P Supply of all Observed Films
 (Logistic regression, dependent variable is downloaded [1] vs. not downloaded [0].)

	Supply Model 1a				Supply Model 1b			
	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.103	(0.075)	-0.066	0.902	-0.149*	(0.078)	-0.092	0.862
Copies in theaters (logged)	0.639***	(0.108)	0.292	1.895	0.652***	(0.108)	0.285	1.918
Tickets sold (logged)	0.190*	(0.101)	0.087	1.209	0.208**	(0.106)	0.091	1.232
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.049	(0.101)	0.022	1.050	0.048	(0.106)	0.021	1.049
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	0.069	(0.099)	0.031	1.071	0.074	(0.102)	0.032	1.077
Main genres	Family				0.262**	(0.105)	0.120	1.299
	Escapism				0.328***	(0.114)	0.140	1.388
	Violence				0.352***	(0.112)	0.154	1.423
	High culture				-0.088	(0.105)	-0.038	0.915
	Light entertainment				-0.177*	(0.103)	-0.078	0.838
Constant	0.598*	(0.310)		1.818	0.799**	(0.326)		2.224
	OLS R ²		0.10		0.16			
	N		449		449			

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Table 10. Explanation of P2P Demand for all Observed Films Available for Downloading During Tracking Period.

(Linear regression, dependent variable is logged number of downloads.)

	Demand Model 1a				Demand Model 1b			
	B	(Std error)	β	t	B	(Std error)	β	t
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.392***	(0.064)	-0.359	-6.102	-0.368***	(0.064)	-0.337	-5.728
Copies in theaters (logged)	0.210*	(0.110)	0.112	1.906	0.276**	(0.111)	0.147	2.489
Tickets sold (logged)	0.175*	(0.092)	0.111	1.908	0.168*	(0.091)	0.107	1.848
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.069	(0.095)	0.042	0.725	0.060	(0.093)	0.037	0.644
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	0.254***	(0.094)	0.158	2.707	0.252***	(0.093)	0.156	2.717
Main genres								
Family					-0.047	(0.079)	-0.035	-0.593
Escapism					0.217**	(0.084)	0.151	2.596
Violence					0.045	(0.089)	0.030	0.510
High culture					-0.139	(0.097)	-0.084	-1.431
Light entertainment					-0.158*	(0.085)	-0.108	-1.865
Constant	6.580***	(0.265)		24.854	6.457***	(0.263)		24.525
	OLS R ²		0.17				0.20	
	N		245				245	

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Films in Theaters

Tables 11 and 12 restrict the preceding analyses by focusing on films that played in theaters during the observation period (May-June 2008). This segment includes only films, which in theory were also available through legal channels and whose online piracy therefore meets the broadest definition of

“substitution.”¹⁵ Compared with the supply models of all observed films, the significantly increased explained variance and the higher number of significant variables indicate a closer connection between P2P supply and theater distribution for content that is currently available in cinemas. This also means an increased impact of audience judgment, as demonstrated by the coefficients of *tickets sold* and *IMDb viewer rating*. In this sense, the supply of current releases is reminiscent of the demand for all observed films. However, as in the case of Supply Model 1, the number of copies distributed is still the most important factor in determining which content appears on P2P networks. More recent content is more likely to get pirated online (Supply Model 2a), although this relationship disappears when controlling for genre (Supply Model 2b). With the exception of *high culture*, all genre categories are significant predictors of which films appear in the P2P supply. Interestingly, the impact of *light entertainment* is again negative. *Family-oriented*, *escapist* and *violent content* catches the attention of P2P gatekeepers more quickly than do other genres.

Given the especially high explanatory power of Supply Models 2a and 2b, these findings underscore the definitive impact that both cinematic sales effort and audience appeal exert on P2P supply of current films. Films supported by heavy marketing investment are more likely to appear on P2P networks. Leaks to P2P networks are further facilitated by their popularity with audiences. Ironically, the sales effort by distribution channels translates into supporting not only legal consumption but also the substitution paradigm.

In marked contrast, P2P demand for the pool of current theatrical releases is much less complex. It is essentially a matter of “freshness,” with downloader interest being highest for the newest releases and declining afterward. The lower explained variance of Demand Models 2a and 2b also indicates that production and distribution parameters fail to capture much of what actually drives demand in this segment. Furthermore, given that *proximity to premiere date* is the only significant predictor of downloads, downloader interest for new releases is rather generic and perhaps also superficial. The addition of genres in Demand Model 2b somewhat shades this suggestion: It is indeed fresh and/or violent content that gets downloaded in higher numbers. However, as downloading does not necessarily mean actual consumption (on which we have no information), this should not be interpreted as a lack of focus. Nevertheless, the contrast between supply driven by cinematic distribution and audience response on one hand and demand mostly unaffected by these factors on the other is highly instructive on the mechanisms shaping the P2P marketplace in the segment where options of legal consumptions are (theoretically) available.

¹⁵ See our earlier caution, against considering theatrical availability, without information on proximity to potential audiences, as an effective option at our discussion of the Hungarian movie distribution infrastructure.

Table 11. Explanation of P2P Supply of Films in Theaters During Tracking Period.
(Logistic regression, dependent variable is downloaded [1] vs. not downloaded [0].)

	Supply Model 2a				Supply Model 2b			
	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.241*	(0.124)	-0.164	0.786	-0.163	(0.148)	-0.082	0.850
Copies in theaters (logged)	1.005***	(0.196)	0.432	2.733	1.171***	(0.233)	0.375	3.227
Tickets sold (logged)	0.521**	(0.207)	0.212	1.683	0.593**	(0.256)	0.180	1.810
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.150	(0.264)	0.049	1.162	-0.399	(0.406)	-0.098	0.671
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	0.449**	(0.224)	0.150	1.567	0.452*	(0.273)	0.112	1.572
Main genres	Family				0.575**	(0.247)	0.176	1.778
	Escapism				1.304***	(0.441)	0.316	3.683
	Violence				1.125***	(0.391)	0.212	3.080
	High culture				-0.339	(0.242)	-0.088	0.712
	Light entertainment				-0.472*	(0.246)	-0.129	0.623
Constant	0.627*	(0.368)		1.872	1.250***	(0.453)		3.490
	OLS R ²		0.30				0.46	
	N		182				182	

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Table 12. Explanation of P2P Demand for Films in Theaters and Available for Downloading During Tracking Period.
(Linear regression, dependent variable is logged number of downloads.)

	Demand Model 2a				Demand Model 2b			
	B	(Std error)	β	t	B	(Std error)	β	t
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.411***	(0.112)	-0.427	-3.673	-0.372***	(0.122)	-0.386	-3.045
Copies in theaters (logged)	0.104	(0.209)	0.052	0.496	0.362	(0.221)	0.181	1.638
Tickets sold (logged)	0.294	(0.194)	0.168	1.517	0.291	(0.194)	0.166	1.499
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.184	(0.207)	0.096	0.888	-0.016	(0.231)	-0.009	-0.071
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	0.031	(0.235)	0.015	0.133	-0.012	(0.232)	-0.006	-0.051
Main genres	Family				0.114	(0.146)	0.088	0.783
	Escapism				0.280	(0.175)	0.172	1.601
	Violence				0.604**	(0.239)	0.270	2.526
	High culture				-0.235	(0.204)	-0.121	-1.150
	Light entertainment				-0.160	(0.171)	-0.097	-0.935
Constant	6.576***	(0.342)		19.237	6.429***	(0.340)		18.920
	OLS R^2		0.13		0.20			
	N		85		85			

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Films Not in Theaters

The picture is again very different for the supply of films beyond their theatrical lifecycle (Table 13). With low explained variance, cinematic distribution has but a small influence on what is shared from this stock.¹⁶ The two significant predictors in both models nonetheless provide some insights into the way P2P supply operates in this segment. On one hand, there is a "fading memory effect": As films age, they are less likely to appear in the P2P supply. On the other hand, this is compensated by a "learning effect":

¹⁶ As with all previous models, explanatory power (the R^2 coefficient) would likely be higher with the inclusion of DVD distribution data.

Films with a longer theatrical presence—a likely proxy for higher consumer awareness—have an increased chance to become available for online piracy after theaters stop playing them. Put differently, while much of the impact of the cinematic sales effort goes into underpinning the P2P supply of current releases, it also has some residual effect on older releases in the form of wider P2P availability of films getting longer theater play. On the demand side (Table 14), however, there is still a noticeable effect of both sales effort and audience appeal. Perhaps more interestingly, a film's age does not affect its P2P demand once theaters stop playing it.

Finally, as a matter of speculation, the nonexistent impact of major marketing parameters on P2P supply in this segment may also imply a wider ground for noncommercial content than it does in the case of current releases. In addition to following market trends in the short run, P2P releasers may also be remedying perceived market failures by making available works that are out of the mainstream in the long run.

Table 13. Explanation of P2P Supply of Films Beyond Their Theatrical Life Cycle During Tracking Period.

(Logistic regression, dependent variable is downloaded [1] vs. not downloaded [0].)

	Supply Model 3a				Supply Model 3b			
	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)	B	(Std error)	β	Exp(B)
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.622***	(0.239)	-0.168	0.537	-0.639***	(0.243)	-0.165	0.528
Copies in theaters (logged)	0.189	(0.146)	0.078	1.208	0.213	(0.150)	0.085	1.238
Tickets sold (logged)	0.142	(0.138)	0.063	1.153	0.129	(0.139)	0.055	1.138
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.239*	(0.127)	0.114	1.270	0.236*	(0.131)	0.108	1.266
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	-0.020	(0.119)	-0.010	0.981	-0.021	(0.119)	-0.010	0.980
Main genres	Family				0.030	(0.124)	0.014	1.031
	Escapism				0.106	(0.128)	0.050	1.112
	Violence				0.224*	(0.118)	0.118	1.252
	High culture				-0.013	(0.123)	-0.006	0.987
	Light entertainment				-0.009	(0.124)	-0.004	0.991
Constant	3.247***	(1.092)		25.723	3.286***	(1.112)		26.734
	OLS R^2		0.04		0.06			
	N		267		267			

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Table 14. Explanation of P2P Demand for Films Beyond Their Theater Life Cycle and Available for Downloading During Tracking Period.

(Linear regression, dependent variable is logged number of downloads.)

	Demand Model 3a				Demand Model 3b			
	B	(Std error)	β	t	B	(Std error)	β	t
Time between premiere and observation window in weeks (logged)	-0.308	(0.188)	-0.130	-1.635	-0.228	(0.188)	-0.096	-1.218
Copies in theaters (logged)	0.253*	(0.128)	0.150	1.975	0.294**	(0.129)	0.174	2.268
Tickets sold (logged)	0.080	(0.113)	0.055	0.703	0.026	(0.114)	0.018	0.227
Theatrical life span (logged)	0.020	(0.113)	0.014	0.175	0.078	(0.112)	0.053	0.693
IMDb viewer rating (logged)	0.356***	(0.102)	0.268	3.498	0.360***	(0.101)	0.270	3.558
Main genres								
Family					-0.118	(0.102)	-0.090	-1.162
Escapism					0.239**	(0.097)	0.190	2.451
Violence					-0.077	(0.091)	-0.063	-0.844
High culture					-0.101	(0.110)	-0.071	-0.921
Light entertainment					-0.168*	(0.097)	-0.130	-1.741
Constant	6.198***	(0.842)		7.358	5.853***	(0.839)		6.978
	OLS R^2		0.09		0.13			
	N		160		160			

*p<0.1 **p<0,05 ***p<0,01

Implications for Small Local Markets

This article's findings have some specific implications for the film industry of small countries and also, to a certain extent, for European film production. Owing to its limited market influence, the film industry in small countries typically relies on government subsidies and tax deductions. Most of the films produced in this context fall into the art house category, with niche audiences and limited mass appeal. The funding schemes leave little room and budget to support anything beyond production; marketing and distribution costs are usually left uncovered. This situation leaves these productions without significant theater audiences. But as the models demonstrate, these factors also negatively impact their accessibility on P2P markets. If we believe that free availability has the potential to turn at least a fraction of pirates into customers of legitimate (recorded) content, we wonder what further damage this limited P2P availability does to the already limited profitability of these productions. It will take further and more pointed research to quantify the distribution and marketing potential of local P2P marketplaces for films that have difficulty competing successfully in the global cinema marketplace. We presume that P2P marketplaces do not have a direct negative impact on the size of theater audiences of films produced in small countries (partly due to them being limited anyway). Therefore, P2P piracy poses little (if any) threat to producers of such content. But as P2P networks are clearly capable of delivering additional audiences to producers, a well-defined policy could use P2P markets to support film distribution rather than consider them as liabilities.

Conclusions

This article has attempted to investigate the interconnections of cinematic distribution and the illegal P2P marketplace. Thanks to the matching of market statistics with transactional data, our study provides insight into hitherto unexplored aspects of online piracy. While its findings are specific to one type of cultural goods (movies) and one single local market (Hungary), its implications are broader and show directions for future research.

P2P Supply

Our findings suggest that the shortage paradigm may indeed play a stronger role in the evolution of P2P black markets than does substitution of legal purchase options. Research indicates that 3 out of every 4 films available via the P2P networks surveyed were no longer in theatrical circulation at the time of data collection. Also, those downloading films from dated catalogs outnumber those downloading content currently playing in movie theaters. We should emphasize that this study could not fully address the issue of shortage versus substitution due to the unavailability of data on DVD, TV, and VOD consumption of the titles whose P2P circulation was observed.

The impact of cinematic distribution on a film's P2P supply varies as a function of its market cycle. In the case of films in theaters at the time of observation, P2P supply is heavily impacted by the

sales effort of legal distributors while audience appeal plays a secondary role. In contrast, the sales effort has no significant effect on the P2P availability of the films not playing in theaters, which is influenced instead by age and earlier theater life span. These observations are also related to the varying propensity of different genres to appear on P2P networks.

P2P Demand

P2P demand for films playing in cinemas is a function of novelty rather than investment in marketing: In this segment, whatever film in theaters is closer to its premiere date is downloaded in higher quantities than are those that have been playing in theaters longer. Our data do not allow further conclusions, as parameters of theater distribution account for only a small fraction of the variance of a film's downloads while still in theaters. Therefore, we can only speculate on what this means. One possibility is that attention to current theatrical releases among P2P pirates is generic because it is superficial and related to a behavior that has the appearance of omnivorousness, but in reality is no more than purposeless rambling amid the confusing amount of options offered by an endless stream of new content.

Interestingly, the impact of distributors' sales efforts only becomes a significant predictor of P2P demand once a film is beyond its theatrical life cycle. It is also during this later theatrical life span stage that audience judgment exerts a significant effect on the quantity of downloads a film generates.

These observations seem to fit general trends and thus are not specific to the Hungarian market. In the case of new releases, it is worth mentioning that the phenomenon of "0-day" releases, that is, the continuous competition between different release groups on who first gets to release an illegal copy clearly shows the importance of freshness that is a measure of not only the competence of releasers but also that of the demand for such titles. Furthermore, data from weekly top P2P download charts¹⁷ suggest that the most downloaded movies on P2P networks are recent (a few days or at most one or two weeks old) releases and the survival rate on such a list is very low: Nearly two-thirds of the movies featured on the torrentfreak.com-compiled weekly lists of the most downloaded films in 2011 stayed on the lists for three weeks or less.¹⁸ For older titles, Smith and Telang (2008) show that TV broadcasts of movies, which can be interpreted as a form of marketing of older titles, generate considerable demand both on Amazon.com (in the form of DVD sales) and on P2P channels (in the form of downloads).

The P2P Model of Content Consumption

The unique modus operandi of P2P file sharing suggests that the traditional logics, channels, and institutions of film distribution are challenged by factors other than the oft-quoted factors of price, availability, and format. This article substantiates the assumption that the contexts of content

¹⁷ Such a chart is published weekly by <http://torrentfreak.com/>

¹⁸ Walls (1998) shows that the survival rates in Hong Kong movie distribution are even more skewed: 80% of movies in the study survive 3 weeks or less in cinematic distribution.

consumption are also being redefined by the advent of online piracy. Torrent-based film distribution gave birth to a programming logic that arranges both mainstream popular supply and fragmented niche demand into one single prefiltered jukebox, which reserves certain leverage for gatekeepers, but at the same time allows users unprecedented freedom of choice. What follows from these findings is that cinematic marketing has a bigger impact on supply than it does on demand in the P2P marketplace. The P2P model is somewhere between the thematic cable TV channel and the video rental shop. Local consumer communities filter and narrow the global supply of content by tailoring it to their own needs. In this sense, P2P marketplaces function as a remedy to the shortages caused by market failures.

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